Trans-Inclusive Philosophies
A Response to Sophie Grace Chappell
In a recent article, Sophie Grace Chappell argues against the necessity of having an all-embracing systematic theory of transgender. She states,
The fear is that we're engaging in a game, the game of system building that we don't need to play. My suspicion is of a kind of ‘gatekeeping’. Some people want us to build a theory of what gender and transgender and gender identity and gender identification are. I worry that there's a demand out there, namely to say: you're not allowed to be trans until you can give me your theory of being trans. That's the gatekeeping worry, and I think it's an absurd demand.
She then denies the requirement for having necessary and sufficient conditions for making true statements.
I expect most of you are sitting on a chair. I can't give you a necessary-and-sufficient-conditions-definition of what it is for anything to be a chair. I'm also drinking a cup of tea. I can't give you a necessary-and-sufficient-conditions-definition of what it is to be tea[...] Nonetheless, I sit on chairs, and I drink tea, and I am transgender. And, since I'm a trans woman, I am a woman. And all of these things are true, and you can't go imposing on people the gatekeeping obligation to have a theory of chairs before they're allowed to sit on them or a theory of what tea is before they're allowed to drink tea[...] By the same token, you can't impose on trans people the requirement that they antecedently be able to define woman and man and transgender and have a theory of all this stuff before they're allowed to be it. No one needs a theory of cisgender in order to be cisgender. They're just allowed to do that. Right?
This part of the article caught my attention because I think I’m one of those people who want a definition. And the reason why is that I want to understand. Of course, I’m sympathetic to Chappell’s claim that we don’t need a definition of chairs to know that we sit on them, but this is consistent with the fact that there are better and worse definitions, and it seems valuable to figure out what the best one is.
Another benefit of having a definition is that it fosters clear communication. If you point to a cup of tea and call it a chair, I don’t know what you’re talking about. We’re clearly not using the words in the same way. Likewise, if I point to myself and say I’m a woman, the vast majority of people wouldn’t understand what I mean. This is why, it seems to me, people talk past each other in regard to gender.
I remember watching a video in which a politician asked an academic if men can get pregnant. The academic said “yes” because trans men can get pregnant. The politician thought that answer was ridiculous. But it was apparent to me that the two people were using the word “men” differently. The politician was referring to a person’s sex. The academic was referring to gender identity.
In general, every time I hear the word “gender,” I’m not sure what the other person is talking about. Are they talking about gender identity, gender normativity, gender expression, or sex? This is to say that clarity is helpful for communication, and one big step in that direction is having a definition.
Besides these benefits, a definition seems to be necessary to defend core claims. To elaborate, without necessary and sufficient conditions, people can exclude others according to whatever account, theory, or definition they have. People can simply say that trans women aren’t women because of reason x, y, or z. Unless we’re okay with people operating with different definitions, there has to be some defense or justification for preferring one of them. And that project seems indistinguishable from the project of coming up with a necessary-and-sufficient-conditions definition.
For example, if someone says trans women aren’t women because they’re not adult human females, and you try to poke holes in that definition, aren’t you trying to point out something unnecessary and/or insufficient? And if you’re doing that, then it seems you assume that there are necessary and sufficient conditions, because if the definition isn’t supposed to have necessary and sufficient conditions to begin with, then on what basis would you be rejecting it? I really don’t see another option here.
Now, Chappell’s claim is that coming up with systematic theories is inappropriate because life is too complicated. She specifically refers to trying to come up with the one true theory of ethics. Again, I’m sympathetic to this position but only so far. I don’t see how we can determine whether something is right or wrong if there are different, legitimate theories giving you conflicting answers. Likewise, if there are multiple, equally legitimate theories of gender giving conflicting accounts of what a woman is, then how can you say what a woman is or isn’t? Again, it seems that you need a definition to defend core claims.
One response could be that not all theories are equally legitimate. That’s fine; I’d agree with that. But, again, how are we supposed to determine which one is better without referring to necessary and sufficient conditions?
This brings me to my next point about gatekeeping. I think Chappell is correct—there is an attempt to decide who’s included and excluded, but I don’t see how it’s avoidable. Other than the byproduct of simply having a definition, which necessarily excludes things that don’t fall within the definition, there’s the political battle over access to spaces. Who should be allowed into women’s spaces? Why does this person count as a woman? If we allow multiple conflicting theories, what do we do? I’m not sure, but it doesn’t seem like either side is satisfied with this situation.
I think we encounter the same scenario when it comes to sex. This is what Chappell has to say:
Biological sex is a cluster concept. It doesn't hang just on chromosomes. It doesn't hang just on external anatomy. It doesn't hang just on internal anatomy. It doesn't hang on hormones. It doesn't hang on how you're perceived or how you perceive yourself. It's a cluster concept. There's a whole row of boxes that one might tick. People in general line up with the cluster "stereotypically male" or the cluster "stereotypically female", but lots of people don't line up that neatly. And in particular, and because it's a cluster concept, some of those boxes are changeable, in particular hormones, phenotypical morphology of the body, and, of course, whether you are taken to be a woman or a man. All of that is changeable, and changing enough of it is literally changing the sex.
Notice how this position consists of an account of sex as a cluster concept. I’m not sure if she has a particular definition in mind, but I know there are multiple. And I know that according to at least one definition of sex, sex is immutable (at least with our current technology).
So what do we do with the fact that there are multiple conflicting accounts, theories, and definitions? Do we just tolerate people operating with different conceptions? No. Because for personal or political reasons, people on both sides want to be able to say that x is a woman or not a woman or that x is female or not female. If so, then the quest for the one true account of sex and/or gender is unavoidable.
Lastly, I should mention that I interviewed Chappell about her book, Trans Figured. You can watch it here.