Is the Moral Worth of Human Life Prior to Autonomy?
I don't think so. I think it's the other way around.
Someone posted this on Twitter:
“A bit of a philosophical point, but individual autonomy has been born out of the value for individual human life (Kant) The irony of autonomy being a floating concept out-with and above the innate value of human life is odd.”
If I understand the author correctly, I believe they’re saying that we care about your autonomy because you matter. We don’t care about autonomy for autonomy’s sake.
J. David Velleman has made a similar argument in his paper, “A Right of Self-Termination?”
Response
I should first clarify that I think autonomy and well-being are very closely related. I honestly have a hard time separating the two, especially because I think living a life according to our values is a crucial component of our well-being. So the following commentary should be understood in that context.
With that in mind, I'd say the author has the values flipped. I think the moral status of people is contingent on the fact that we have lives that can go better or worse for us. In other words, the fact that we're things that can have well-being/ill-being is what makes us morally matter, and, specifically, I’m referring to the well-being/ill-being that we can experience given our sentience. L.W. Sumner has said the same thing; I’m just echoing him.
Here’s the argument:
First, I'd say that I don't think inanimate objects innately morally matter. And second, none of the necessary traits that make a living thing different from a nonliving thing seem to generate this innate moral worth.
Aristotle thought that the main difference between living things and nonliving things was “the capacity to resist internal and external perturbations.”
Schulze-Makuch et al. define living systems
“as those that are: (1) composed of bounded micro-environments in thermodynamic equilibrium with their surroundings; (2) capable of transforming energy to maintain their low-entropy states; and (3) able to replicate structurally distinct copies of themselves from an instructional code perpetuated indefinitely through time despite the demise of the individual carrier through which it is transmitted.”
There are other definitions of life, but I haven’t encountered any that would generate innate moral worth. More seems to be required, and I think it’s sentience.
Consider bacteria. Do we think bacteria have innate moral worth even though they're alive? No. I don’t think the vast majority of people think we can wrong bacteria by mistreating them. On the other hand, I think animals and humans have innate moral worth, and the only trait I can think of that would explain that is sentience.
Why is sentience so important? One answer is that it’s because it enables us to experience well-being/ill-being. I assume bacteria can’t suffer whereas animals and humans can.
So how does autonomy fit into this?
One significant type of suffering is constituted by not living a life according to one’s values. In extreme forms, it could be described as existential suffering. Hence, we have good reason to value autonomy because of its crucial role in a person’s well-being. You may also think autonomy has its own value, independent of how it constitutes well-being. I’m not sure what I think about that.
The argument, in summary, is this: The capacity to live according to our values (autonomy) partly grounds the innate moral worth of human lives because our capacity to experience well-being/ill-being creates the innate moral worth of human lives, and autonomy is a crucial part of our well-being/ill-being.