Another Unsuccessful Attempt to Reject the Pet-Human Euthanasia Analogy
A response to Mark Komrad and Oliver Glass
Komrad and Glass wrote an anti-euthanasia article outlining important differences between pet and human euthanasia. They are as follows:
The Hierarchy of Life Value - There is a widespread belief that human life is more valuable than animal life, which is evidenced by the fact that we punish the killing of human beings more so than the killing of animals.
The Importance of Sentience - Our level of sentience is more advanced than animal sentience, and therefore more valuable.
The Difference Between the Doctor/Human Relationship and Veterinarian/Animal Relationship - The former is characterized by humans treating humans and so is characterized by empathy. The latter is characterized by humans treating animals and so is characterized by sympathy. They state, “The long and venerable history of medical ethics is built around the therapeutic encounter of human equals in the therapeutic relationship.”
Humans Are Capable of Creating Elaborate and Sophisticated Meaning - “Physicians can minister to suffering patients not just with somatic interventions and medicaments, but also invoking meaning, symbolism, interpretation, reflection on relationships, contemplation of the past and the future, and the consequences of their suffering or dying on others.” They continue, “The tool kit to address suffering is vastly more elaborate for treating humans than for treating animals. Even if human patients are unconscious or comatose, their world of meaning can be deeply conjured via loved ones, biographical information, and so on. This ability to connect meaningfully, and to imagine the mind of another, enables palliative care to be deployed for suffering humans in a far more elaborate and effective way than for animals.”
Awareness of the Dual Nature of Medicine's Power to Heal and Harm - Allowing euthanasia would fundamentally change the doctor-patient relationship. Human beings need to know that their doctors will not kill them; animals don’t.
The Problem of Suicide - Allowing assisted suicide interferes with the effort of preventing suicide and creates deep moral confusion. This isn’t an issue with animals because they don’t take their own lives.
Psychosocial Considerations - Some people are driven to an assisted death due to psychosocial concerns, such as a lack of housing and services. This violates a social contract that we have with one another that justifies addressing injustice and inequity. The authors write, “Societies can be let off the hook of solving problems like inequity and other values of the social contract, by permitting human beings to choose euthanasia rather than fixing social injustice and inequity.” In contrast, euthanizing animals doesn’t really impact our social contract with other humans.
The Slippery Slope - Allowing assisted death will eventually lead to bad outcomes. First, it will lead to a loosening of the qualifying criteria. Second, it will be offered as a replacement for care due to its cost savings. And third, it may eventually be seen as a virtuous choice such that people who don’t choose it will be deemed selfish. Pet euthanasia has no such slippery slope.
Response
Regarding the first and second, I’d agree that we generally view human life and sentience as more valuable than their animal counterparts. But this position is consistent with the fundamental moral arguments in favor of assisted death—that is autonomy and well-being. Without addressing these arguments, the hierarchy of value and sentience is argumentatively inert.
To elaborate, I also think that human lives are more valuable than animal lives, and if I were in a position to save a human being or a dog, I’d save the human being. But this doesn’t mean that death can’t be good for humans like it can be for our pets. Furthermore, the fact that we’re more cognitively sophisticated allows us to consent to an assisted death, whereas animals don’t have this ability. So actually this acts as an argument in favor of human euthanasia.
In general, many opponents of assisted death argue for the value of human life, but this approach is usually accompanied by the claim that human life has intrinsic value and that death is always bad for the person who dies. The authors don’t convincingly show why this is true for humans but not animals.
Regarding three, nothing they say is an argument in favor of pet euthanasia but not human euthanasia. The doctor-patient relationship doesn’t have to be the exact same as the vet-animal relationship in order to justify assisted death in both cases. Again, the arguments in favor are autonomy and well-being.
Their fourth point doesn’t actually show why death is necessarily bad for us. They just say that doctors can help patients through their suffering in more sophisticated ways, which I agree with.
Also, the claim that people can transcend their suffering doesn’t mean that people will. It seems more plausible that some won’t benefit overall from their suffering. I make that point here.
The point about comatose patients is odd. I don’t see why others conjuring up a world of meaning for these patients makes it such that continuing to live is necessarily overall good for the patients.
Ultimately, without addressing deprivationism, no argument about the benefit or harm of death is sufficient, and the authors don’t address it.
Regarding point five, I don’t see why humans need to know that their doctors won’t kill them. Do we need to know that our doctors also won’t let us die? Of course, not. This suggests that this concern is based on a moral distinction between killing and letting die, which I have addressed here. Also, I should note that the killing vs. letting die distinction is actually irrelevant because it assumes that death is necessarily a harm, which is false. Death can be good for the person who dies, so whether it’s brought about via an act or an omission doesn’t matter.
Regarding six, the problem of suicide, though there is an asymmetry between humans and animals, is actually not a problem. In general, there are two different groups of people—those who truly prefer death and those who don’t. Assisted death is for the former while suicide prevention is for the latter. There is no moral confusion.
Does the fact that doctors let some patients die cause moral confusion even though doctors are supposed to save lives? No, it doesn’t. Sometimes it’s appropriate to let a patient die while other times it’s not.
Point seven is also not a good argument against assisted death. Granted, there is an asymmetry; animals don’t choose to die due to a lack of housing or services. But the same could be said of letting people die. People can be pushed to choose to refuse life-saving or life-sustaining care due to a lack of housing or services. Is this a good argument against allowing people to refuse care? No. Thus, the asymmetry the authors present doesn’t do the work they need it to do.
Also, society’s obligation to address injustice and inequity is consistent with allowing assisted death, just like it’s consistent with honoring people’s refusals.
Regarding point eight, their slippery slope objection can be split up into two parts. The first is regarding the loosening of the qualifying criteria. This is not problematic because it depends on whether the expansion is justified. The authors specifically mention first restricting assisted death to terminal patients but then expanding it to nonterminal patients. In my view, this is not a slippery slope because I think nonterminal patients should have access to it, just like they should be able to refuse life-saving care.
The second part is about offering euthanasia as a cheaper alternative to care and deeming euthanasia as the virtuous choice. In response, both of these outcomes could equally apply to refusing life-sustaining treatment. It’s cheaper to let people die, and it could be seen as selfish to try to live as long as possible. Are these good arguments for not honoring refusals of care? No.
So, again, the authors highlight an asymmetry that doesn’t do the work they want it to do.